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Simmons Self-Storage v. Rib Roof, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug. 7, 2014)1
PROPERTY LAW: MECHANIC’S LIEN
Summary
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether a mechanic or materialman must prove
either that the materials were only delivered for use or whether the materials were actually used
for the property in order to establish a lien on the property; (2) whether a property subject to a
lien may still be sold where a surety bond has been posted, or whether the lien judgment should
be satisfied from the surety bond.
Disposition
A materialman may establish a lien against a property or any improvements made for
which he supplied materials in the amount of the unpaid balance due on those materials; he does
not have to prove that the delivered materials were actually used for the property. Additionally,
because a surety bond replaces property as security for an established lien, the property cannot be
sold when a surety bond is posted.
Factual and Procedural History
Respondent Rib Roof, Inc. (“Rib Roof”) is a manufacturer and supplier of steel products.
Appellant Simmons Self-Storage (“Simmons”) is a general contractor for six major projects
throughout Nevada, and subcontracted with respondent to furnish and install steel products for
the projects. Rib Roof delivered the steel to the particular job sites using bills of lading to
confirm proper delivery. However, 19 of the 80 bills of landing lacked consignee signatures.
Simmons made no payment for the steel furnished for one property, and partially paid
respondent for the steel delivered for the other five properties.
Despite the partial payment, Simmons sent an email to Rib Roof requesting lien release
forms, which were drawn up by Rib Roof’s bookkeeper Trish Cartwright. Cartwright knew she
lacked authority to actually sign the lien releases, yet nevertheless signed the lien waiver and
release forms for two of the six projects.
As a result of the Simmons’ partial payment, Rib Roof properly enacted mechanic’s liens
on all six properties in compliance with required statutory notice and recording. Rib Roof then
filed a complaint for foreclosure against each property. Simmons answered by posting surety
bonds totaling 1.5 times the value of the mechanic’s liens on four of the six properties, relying on
the waiver forms signed by Ms. Cartwright for the other two projects.
The district court concluded that providing materials to a job site created a presumption
that those materials were used for the property or improvements thereto, and thus the liens
established on all six properties were valid. District court also ruled that Ms. Cartwright did not
have the proper authority to sign the lien waiver forms, and therefore the waivers were
unenforceable. Finally, the district court ordered all six properties be sold to satisfy the
remaining lien on the two projects for which a bond was not posted.
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Discussion
Lien rights
The parties dispute the meaning of the terms “furnish” in NRS 108.222, which authorizes
mechanic’s liens generally.2 Simmons contends that “furnish” means a lien right exists only
when the materials were actually “used” for the property, while Rib Roof contends that “furnish”
only requires delivery of the materials. The Court agrees with Rib Roof and holds that to furnish
“encapsulates a variety of situations, including one where a materialman delivers materials for a
property or improvement thereon…” Therefore, under NRS 108.222, a materialman does not
need to prove that the materials he supplied were actually used or incorporated into the property
in order to enact a lien on the property; rather, he must only prove that they were supplied for use
on the property.
Supplied materials
Although 19 of the 80 bills of lading lacked consignee signatures, the district court’s
finding that Rib Roof properly delivered the required materials is supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, the bills of lading that lacked consignee signatures nevertheless contained
two other signatures from the shipping manager and truck driver.
Waiver
Simmons asserts that Rib Roof waived its liens on two properties as a result of the
unconditional waiver and lien release forms signed by Ms. Cartwright, an employee of Rib Roof.
Rib Roof, however, asserts that the release forms are unenforceable because Ms. Cartwright did
not have the proper authority to sign the forms.
The Court now officially adopts the Restatement’s definition of “actual authority.”3
When examining whether actual authority exists, the focus should be on an agent’s reasonable
belief. Ms. Cartwright admitted that she lacked authority to execute the lien release forms, and
nothing suggests Rib Roof granted her such authority. Therefore, Cartwright lacked actual
authority because she had no reasonable basis for believing that Rib Roof authorized her to sign
the forms. Simmons offered no evidence or argument that Rib Roof knew or acquiesced to Ms.
Cartwright’s acts, and so Ms. Cartwright also lacked apparent authority.
Surety bonds
Surety bonds are authorized by NRS 108.2413.4 Rib Roof did not challenge the validity
of the surety bonds posted by Simmons for the 4 properties, and therefore each surety bond
replaced its corresponding property as security for the lien. However, the district court erred in
ordering the sale of all six properties to satisfy the lien remaining on the two properties upon a
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finding that the lien waiver on those two properties was unenforceable. A court cannot order the
sale of a property to satisfy a lien on a separate property or charges associated with that lien. The
district court also erred by failing to determine the total appropriate charge attributable to each
property to determine if the surety bond satisfied the lien amount. A court can only take action
against a property to satisfy a judgment upon showing that an individual surety bond is
insufficient in relation to its respective charge, and this case was remanded to determine that
issue.
Conclusion
Because a materialman need only prove that the materials were delivered to enact a valid
mechanic’s lien, Rib Roof’s liens against the six properties were valid. Although not all of the
delivery confirmation forms were signed by the appropriate assignee, delivery is sufficiently
proven because the unsigned forms were still signed by other receiving employees. Because Ms.
Cartwright, as bookkeeper, had neither actual nor apparent authority to execute lien release
forms on behalf of Rib Roof, those release forms are unenforceable. Finally, the district court
erred in ordering the sale of all six properties to satisfy the lien remaining on the two properties
not replaced with a surety bond; this case was remanded to determine whether the posted surety
bond for each property was sufficient to cover the properties’ respective lien amount.

